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Abstract  
 
During post-conflict periods, institutions and patterns of action are challenged and renego-
tiated – processes that have long gone largely unrecognized. There continues to be a lack 
of empirical research on the constellations of authority following the cessation of conflict. 
This lack corresponds to deficiencies on the level of policy-making: It appears that Western 
donors, until today, base their approaches to post-conflict reconstruction on the wholly 
unchallenged assumption that the state is the only legitimate actor in this area. This re-
search project focused on core questions in post-conflict security provision by and beyond 
the state. The central question of the project was to determine which actors (such as tradi-
tional authorities, the remnants of state security organs, private entrepreneurs, internation-
al peacekeeping missions etc.) provide security in a situation of fragmented authority, i.e. 
sanctioning violence and crime. Moreover, the project sought to analyze under which con-
ditions these actors are considered legitimate by different groups within society: some 
actors might protect specific groups among the population while representing a threat to 
others. These questions were addressed in empirical case studies of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. The project worked under the basic assumption that oligopolies of violence exist in 
periods directly preceded by conflict, comprising a limited number of actors that produce 
violence and provide security, who both compete and cooperate with each other. It was 
also assumed that oligopolies exhibited significant variation, with one important sub-type 
being an “oligopoly with market leader”. 
The results of this research project tentatively confirm assumptions and hypotheses. The 
importance of a whole number of non-state actors in post-conflict security provision could 
be confirmed during field research in Liberia and Sierra Leone, although the preponderant 
role of peacekeeping missions stands out clearly. The intervention of an external 
peacekeeping force had a resounding impact on the security arena in these post-conflict 
settings. The international actors have taken the lead in providing security in both countries 
as they each emerged from civil war. And they were considered to be the most important 
security provider by an overwhelming majority of survey poll respondents in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. Also, the relative gain in personal and public safety is clearly established 
while the absolute level of the achievements still leaves much to be desired (not least in 
the eyes of the population). Other results point to a widely shared wish to see state actors 
becoming the reliable main security provider while their actual and past behavior does not 
augur too well. Mapping exercises conducted during focus group discussions produced 
some striking results and led to the identification of additional actors who were considered 
relevant in the security sector; most prominent among them were the Community Watch 
Teams. Changes in the composition of the “security market” over time could be observed. 
The findings of the field research were confirmed by the desk study focusing on a larger 
sample of cases. This study underlines the necessity to question the label ‘post-conflict’ 
and avoid the mental dichotomies that lead to a handy identification of ‘post-conflict’ with 
‘peace’. We should strive to understand the particular logic of post-conflict situations 
instead of dismissing them as brief, transitory stages. Such a perspective would also 
improve the research basis for policy advice. Usually, political strategies for post-conflict 
strategies employ timeframes that are far too short. These approaches also grossly 
overestimate the possibilities for social engineering, imagining post-conflict societies as 
‘clean slates’ upon which a bright new future can be written. Another result is first of all 
‘research-relevant’: While there are often excellent single-case studies about post-conflict 
societies, they are usually not included in comparative research designs. This, in turn, 
does not allow the transformation of isolated findings into some generalized patterns. 
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Instead, research often strives to make itself ‘policy-relevant’ by focusing on the conditions 
of success or failure of international interventions case-by-case or propose generalizations 
on a very slim basis. The desk-study lays the groundwork for such a comparative endeavor 
in that it identifies three types of post-conflict societies for meaningful further comparative 
exploitation.  
Some policy-relevant results were as well identified. Both the case studies on Liberia and 
Sierra Leone and the desk study confirm that at least those oligopolies of violence with a 
dominant market leader (usually the peacekeeping mission, later the state) have the 
potential to strongly reduce the level of insecurity, both in perceptions as well as in real 
terms. While it was impossible to gauge the legitimacy of the overall security market 
structure, we could rate the legitimacy of individual violence actors. Apart from 
peacekeepers and state agencies, a predominant proportion of the population perceived 
private security companies and neighborhood watch teams as positive and their services 
relevant to security provision. Oligopolies of violence resulting from a settlement phase of a 
conflict were – as a rule – not followed by monopolies of violence. However, in the 
“success cases”, they were succeeded by oligopolies of violence with a dominant market 
leader. The respondents of the opinion polls conducted in urban Liberia and Sierra Leone 
showed a clear preference for “the” state as the providers of security which might comfort 
the “state-building” community. The ideal of the state (or of the ideal state) is still very 
much present in the mindset of people who have witnessed protracted phases of turmoil 
and war – an interesting finding in itself. However, the more qualitative research 
instruments revealed the distrust towards state agencies as they exist in reality. This mixed 
message is not easy to interpret for practical purposes: The research project as a whole 
invites policymakers to pay considerably more attention to alternative providers of security 
as they can be meaningful locally. Nevertheless, it would certainly go too far to portray 
oligopolies of violence as desirable outcomes of outside intervention. 
The project further sought to identify criteria for selecting non-state armed actors as 
cooperation partners. The need for such cooperation was corroborated by our findings: 
Whoever wishes to avoid costly, enduring protectorates as a by-product of ever more 
complex UN missions should not ignore non-state actors and has to think about 
cooperation. Two main criteria for such cooperation come into play: efficiency and local 
legitimacy. This legitimacy may again partly be the outcome of efficient security provision 
(output legitimacy), or it may be based on charisma, ideology, symbols and myths, or the 
congruence in important norms and convictions between the protectors and the protected. 
It is obvious that most western governments will find it impossible to cooperate with actors 
who openly violate human rights or make appeals for genocide. But even actors who do 
not qualify as partners should not be left out of any analysis about the security situation. As 
a minimum, a sober assessment of their local appreciation is needed.  
What happens when international forces withdraw is relatively unknown, not least because 
the country suddenly becomes less relevant to Western interests. With the exit of a major 
market actor, other actors will struggle to claim as much of the departing actor’s market 
share as possible. On the one hand, remaining major actors will try to improve their market 
position, sometimes through the use of violence. On the other hand, marginal actors will 
(re-)emerge to provide security for small sections of the population. Similar processes 
could be observed in Karachi (Pakistan) and Sierra Leone after UNAMSIL’s withdrawal. 
Clearly, there is much that can still be learned about post-conflict societies.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
In Postkonfliktsituationen werden Institutionen, aber auch Handlungsmuster überprüft und 
neu ausgehandelt, Prozesse, die lange wenig Beachtung gefunden haben. Es gibt immer 
noch einen Mangel an empirischer Forschung zu den Konstellationen von Herrschaftsbe-
ziehungen nach Beendigung von Gewaltkonflikten. Dem entsprechen auch Defizite in der 
praktischen Politik. Bis heute gründen westliche Ansätze zu post-konfliktivem Wiederauf-
bau auf der Annahme, dass der Staat der einzige legitime Akteur im Sicherheitsbereich 
sei. Die zentrale Frage dieses Projekts war demgegenüber, welche Akteure (traditionelle 
Autoritäten, der Rumpfstaat, private Unternehmen, internationale Friedensmissionen etc.) 
in einer Situation fragmentierter Autorität Sicherheit gewährleisten, d.h. Gewalt real kon-
trollieren. Darüber hinaus ging es um die Analyse, wie legitim solche Akteure in den Augen 
unterschiedlicher sozialer Gruppen sind – dies auch unter der Annahme, dass sie be-
stimmte Bevölkerungsgruppen beschützen können, gleichzeitig aber eine Bedrohung von 
anderen darstellen mögen. Diese Fragen wurden zunächst in Fallstudien zu Liberia und 
Sierra Leone untersucht. Das Projekt arbeitete unter der Grundannahme, dass Gewaltoli-
gopole in unmittelbaren Postkonfliktsituationen bestehen, die eine begrenzte Anzahl von 
Gewaltakteuren/Sicherheitsproduzenten umfassen, und die untereinander konkurrieren 
und kooperieren. Hierbei wurden erhebliche Variationen einer solchen Konstellation ange-
nommen, wobei eine wichtige Variante das „Gewaltoligopol mit einem dominanten Markt-
führer“ sein würde.  
Die Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts unterstützen tendenziell die Vorannahmen und 
Hypothesen. Die Bedeutung einer ganzen Anzahl von nicht-staatlichen Akteuren in der 
Gewährleistung von Sicherheit konnte durch die Feldforschung in Liberia und Sierra Leone 
nachgewiesen werden. Allerdings wurde auch die prägende Bedeutung der dortigen 
Peacekeeping-Missionen deutlich. Die Intervention einer auswärtigen Friedensmission 
hatte erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheitsarena. Internationale Akteure waren 
führend in der Sicherheitsgewährleistung in beiden Staaten schon direkt nach Kriegsende. 
Und sie wurden von einer starken Mehrheit der Befragten in Meinungsumfragen in Liberia 
und Sierra Leone als die wichtigsten Sicherheitserzeuger genannt. Die relative 
Verbesserung von persönlicher und allgemeiner Sicherheit konnte nachgewiesen werden, 
während der absolute erreichte Status in den Augen der Befragten noch stark 
verbesserungsfähig war. Andere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass der Wunsch nach 
zuverlässigen staatlichen Akteuren als Hauptträger der Sicherheitsgewährleistung stark 
verbreitet ist, allerdings deutet in der bisherigen Leistungsbilanz wenig darauf hin, dass 
dies mehr als Wunschdenken war. Das graphische Mapping während 
Fokusgruppendiskussionen erbrachte wichtige Ergebnisse für die Konstellationsanalyse 
und half in der Identifizierung weiterer als wichtig erachteter Sicherheitsakteure. Besonders 
prominent waren Community Watch Teams. Eine fortlaufende Veränderung der 
Zusammensetzung des Sicherheitsmarkts konnte beobachtet werden.  
Die Ergebnisse der Feldforschung wurden durch die begleitende Desk-study mit einer 
größeren Anzahl von Fällen bestätigt. Diese Studie unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit der 
Hinterfragung des Etiketts „Post-Konflikt“. Es wird nahegelegt, die vereinfachende 
Gleichsetzung von “Post-Konflikt” mit “Frieden” zu vermeiden. Inhärente Logiken von 
Postkonfliktsituationen erweisen sich als stabil, es handelt sich regelhaft nicht um kurze 
transitorische Phasen. Eine solche Perspektive kann Forschung und Politikberatung 
verbessern. Zeitliche Perspektiven für politische Strategien gegenüber Postkonfliktstaaten 
sind in der Regel zu kurz gefasst. Möglichkeiten des “social engineering” werden 
überschätzt, die Vorstellung einer “Stunde null” in Postkonfliktgesellschaften sind genauso 
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unangemessen, wie die Hoffnung, man könne einfach eine glänzende Zukunft 
herbeizaubern. Ein weiteres Ergebnis ist zunächst forschungsrelevant. Oft können selbst 
hervorragende Einzelfallstudien zu Postkonfliktgesellschaften nicht in komparative 
Forschungsdesigns einbezogen werden. Damit ist die Übertragung von isolierten 
Ergebnissen in generalisierbare Aussagen unmöglich. Stattdessen versuchen viele 
Forschungsprojekte politikrelevant zu sein, indem sie entweder für einen singulären Fall 
Erfolgsfaktoren identifizieren oder sehr weitreichende Generalisierungen auf kleiner 
empirischer Basis anbieten. Die Desk-Study innerhalb dieses Projekts schafft die 
Voraussetzung für sinnvolle Vergleiche durch die Identifizierung von drei Haupttypen von 
Postkonfliktsituationen. Einige praxisrelevante Ergebnisse können aber auch genannt 
werden: Die beiden Fallstudien und die Desk-Study bestätigen, dass „Oligopole mit 
dominantem Marktführer“ (üblicherweise die Peacekeeping-Mission, später auch der 
Staat) das Potenzial haben, Gewalt einzudämmen, sowohl in der Wahrnehmung der 
Bevölkerung, als auch in objektivierbarem Sinn. Es war zwar unmöglich, die Legitimität des 
„Systems“ als Ganzes zu ergründen, die Legitimität einzelner Gewaltakteure konnte aber 
eingeschätzt werden. Demnach nahmen große Teile der Befragten neben staatlichen und 
internationalen Akteuren auch private Sicherheitsdienste und Bürgerwehren als positiv 
wahr und bewerteten ihre Sicherheitsgewährleistung als relevant. Gewaltoligopole, die in 
einer Konfliktbeendigungsphase entstanden waren, wurden üblicherweise nicht in 
Gewaltmonopole überführt. In den „Erfolgsfällen“ entstanden aber Gewaltoligopole mit 
dominantem Markführer. Befragte in städtischen Teilen Liberias und Sierra Leones 
bevorzugten “den Staat“ als Sicherheitsgewährleister. Das Ideal des Staates ist tief in der 
Vorstellungswelt von Menschen verwurzelt, die auch lange Jahre von Unruhen und Krieg 
hinter sich haben; das ist für sich allein ein wichtiges Ergebnis. Bei näherem Hinsehen und 
unter Nutzung qualitativer Forschungsinstrumente wird das Misstrauen gegenüber den real 
existierenden Staatsorganen allerdings deutlich. Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts 
fordern Praktiker dazu auf, mehr Aufmerksamkeit alternativen Sicherheitserzeugern zu 
widmen, da sie lokal sehr bedeutsam sein können. Es wäre aber überzogen, 
Gewaltoligopole als wünschenswerte Ergebnisse äußerer Interventionen zu 
charakterisieren. 
Das Projekt hatte auch zum Ziel, Kriterien zur Auswahl von nicht-staatlichen 
Gewaltakteuren als Kooperationspartner zu identifizieren. Die Notwendigkeit einer solchen 
Kooperation war durch das Projekt bestätigt worden: Wer teure und dauerhafte 
Protektorate als Nebenprodukt immer komplexer werdender UN-Missionen vermeiden 
möchte, sollte nicht-staatliche Akteure nicht ignorieren und gegebenenfalls auch 
kooperieren. Als die beiden Hauptkriterien einer solchen Kooperation bieten sich Effizienz 
und lokale Legitimität an. Legitimität mag ihrerseits teilweise eine auf Leistung beruhende 
Legitimität sein (nämlich durch Gewährleistung von Sicherheit), oder auf Charisma, 
Ideologie, Symbolen und Mythen beruhen bzw. der Übereinstimmung von Werten und 
Überzeugungen zwischen Beschützer und Beschützten. Während klar ist, dass die 
Kooperation mit offen Menschenrechte verletzenden oder zu Genozid aufrufenden 
Akteuren für westliche Regierungen undenkbar sein wird, sollte doch auch in diesen Fällen 
die Analyse der Sicherheitssituation deren positiven wie negativen Beitrag und lokale 
Wahrnehmung untersuchen. Weitgehend unbekannt ist, was passiert, wenn internationale 
Truppen den Rückzug antreten, nicht zuletzt, weil dann das Interesse im Westen 
schwindet. Durch dieses Ausscheiden aus dem Sicherheitsmarkt werden andere Akteure 
motiviert, sich den frei werdenden Marktanteil zu sichern, manchmal auch gewaltsam. 
Gleichzeitig werden marginale Akteure neu auftauchen, um in Marktnischen Sicherheit 
anzubieten. Solche Prozesse konnten in so unterschiedlichen Fällen wie Pakistan und 
Sierra Leone beobachtet werden. Dies macht deutlich, dass man noch einiges über 
Postkonfliktsituationen lernen kann.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
During post-conflict periods, institutions, concepts of law and order as well as patterns of 
action are challenged and renegotiated – processes that have long gone largely unrecog-
nized. The question as to which state or non-state institutions emerge during such situa-
tions has received little if any attention. There continues to be a lack of empirical research 
on the constellations of authority following the cessation of conflict in Africa and elsewhere. 
This corresponds to deficiencies on the level of policy-making: It appears that Western 
donors, until today, base their approaches to post-conflict reconstruction on the wholly 
unchallenged assumption that the state is the only legitimate bearer of the monopoly of 
violence. However, such approaches need to be tempered by questioning the pre-conflict 
state’s validity, for it is generally accepted that the post-colonial state has often played an 
important role in the persistence and escalation of violence. Hence, there must be a prior 
consideration as to whether the state can and should be reconstructed to its pre-conflict 
shape.  
One repeatedly stressed core attribute of statehood is the monopolization of violence. It is 
difficult to find empirical evidence for the Europe-inspired notion of the state with a monop-
oly on taxation and on the use of violence in (West and Central) Africa, where it is only 
superficially internalized by state officials while it is present in their thinking and discourse 
only as a pretence (Erdmann/Engel 2007). In West and Central Africa (empirically) illegiti-
mate monopolies of violence and oligopolies of violence coexist. Both could a) be more or 
less legitimate in the eyes of the population and b) offer a varying degree of security and 
orientation.  
In this context, one important task for social scientists is to determine which actors (such 
as traditional authorities, the remnants of state security organs, private entrepreneurs, 
international peacekeeping missions etc.) provide security in a situation of fragmented 
authority, i.e. sanctioning violence and crime. This points to a related question: Under 
which conditions are these actors considered legitimate by different groups within society. 
This is not a mundane aspect as some actors might protect specific groups among the 
population while representing a threat to others. Frequently, it is only a limited number of 
actors that produce violence and provide security while partly competing, partly cooperat-
ing with each other. Their interplay constitutes what could be termed as an “oligopoly of 
violence”. 
Even after a protracted phase of erosion of state authority, state actors will be present in 
the security field. But there is little reason to consider them a priori as more legitimate than 
others; the normative bias in favor of the state which is endemic in the state-building litera-
ture has to be avoided. Some policy-relevant questions on the macro-level of the state 
were raised in addition to the more academic design of the project: 
1. Can oligopolies of violence reduce the susceptibility of post-conflict societies to 
resort to violence in order to solve conflicts? 
2. Are these oligopolies of violence, consequently, considered legitimate by the cen-
tral players and, more generally, by the population as a whole? 
3. Can legitimate oligopolies of violence be transformed into legitimate monopolies of 
violence? 
4. Should we cling to the ideal of the state’s monopoly of violence even when state 
actors lack legitimacy and have proven themselves to be ineffective at providing 
security? 
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However the dominance of policy-oriented approaches in the mainstream literature on war-
to-peace (or war-to-democracy) transitions has so far not led to realistic policy advices. 
This may be explained by normative biases and a lack of clarity. For instance, when 
speaking of ‘post-conflict’ situations, one must be careful to explicate implicitly any 
preconceptions in such a designation. The whole idea of ‘post-conflict’ easily leads to a 
mental dichotomy that transforms ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ into synonyms of ‘war’ and 
‘peace’. In this dichotomy, ‘conflict’ means situations structured by violence carried out by 
organized actors according to a dominant conflict narrative, while ‘post-conflict’ implicitly 
signals the end of such violence and the return to a peaceful normality. This is obviously 
far from the reality lived on the ground. 
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2.  Oligopolies of violence 
 
2.1  Definition and forms of oligopolies of violence  
Oligopolies of violence comprise a fluctuating number of partly competing, partly 
cooperating actors of violence of different quality. In this context, ruling is based on a 
mixture of real repression and permanent readiness to negotiate (in contrast to the 
symbolic presence of a repressive apparatus and application of rules in the “ideal” 
European state).  
Anthropologists and sociologists have worked on the real functioning of relations of 
domination in West Africa1, but mostly with regard to confined areas of research. The 
specific interest of political science is rather with the systemic (“macro”) and institutional 
level, and it forces us to rethink about terminology and models. Some elements of 
economic theory can be helpful here, particularly those focusing on market relations. 
Economists are intrigued by problems of “imperfect competition” – monopolies and 
oligopolies usually rate poorly regarding their efficiency. A monopoly can be easily defined: 
one singular provider of a product or service. An oligopoly is a situation where there are 
only a few providers of a product or service. But varieties are important (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The variety of oligopolies  
(Oligopoly = “imperfect competition” + “few providers”) 
Main forms: 
Homogeneous oligopoly: few providers of an identical product  
Heterogeneous oligopoly: few providers of differentiated products 
 
Variants: 
Oligopoly based on arrangement – cartel 
Oligopoly with a dominant market leader  
Oligopoly without arrangement /continuous adverse competition 
 
Forms of oligopolies of violence: 
Territorial oligopoly of violence (based on arrangement or with a dominant leader etc.)2 
Functional oligopoly of violence (= always: heterogeneous oligopoly) 
Temporal oligopoly of violence (seasonal variations; night and day) 
 
This perspective on security provision within an imperfect security market is obviously 
based on rational choice considerations and involves some cost-benefit analysis 
concerning all stakeholders. It can be expected that the lower the market concentration, 
the higher the level of violence (Mehler 2004: 545). 
                                                 
1 Sometimes termed as the “cultural constructions regarding the nature of political power” (Hoffman 2003:211). 
2 Regarding the territorial dimension, Boone (1998: 139) suggests “that a radically decentralized political order could 
be forged on the basis of existing, local-level structures of political authority and economic exchange”. 
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2.2  Oligopolies of violence – a perspective “from above” 
As already noted, governing elites usually pretend to uphold a monopoly on the use of 
violence. Everything that could challenge this claim will be discarded and is difficult to be 
discussed in “political dialogues”. The European (or “Westphalian”) notion of the “state” 
may even be well-absorbed, a “lesson learnt” and, subjectively, what governing elites are 
aiming at. This paragraph is not so much about the elite’s view of the constellation of 
violent actors/security providers, but rather an “objective perspective” from a bird’s-eye 
view. But it is also about the fundamental possibilities of cooperation and confrontation that 
oligopolists themselves own.  
Nevertheless a brief explanation of the aforementioned differentiation will be necessary: In 
a territorial oligopoly of violence, the main actors may find relatively stable arrangements 
amongst themselves in order to distribute areas and zones of control within the state. In 
these areas they might exert a monopoly on violence. Without the formal attribution of 
sovereignty by international law they lack important political and material resources, which 
presents a more volatile situation justifying a separate conceptualization from a nation-
wide monopoly of violence (Büttner 2003: 8). A second option is the functional oligopoly 
which stresses the idea that different violence actors/protectors provide security from 
different kinds of threats (from different kinds of aggressors) or for specific social 
categories: Vigilantes working particularly for the protection of merchants on market days 
(market police) are one example. The Bakassi Boys in Onitsha, Nigeria are probably the 
most famous example (Baker 2002, Harnischfeger 2003, Meagher 2007). Ethnic militias 
may protect ethnic fellows – partly the background of the “young patriots”, at least in the 
rural municipalities of Southern Côte d’Ivoire (Chauveau/Bobo 2003), or of varying Area 
boys groups in Southern Nigeria (Gore/Pratten 2003). Those actors may compete or 
cooperate with each other.3 
The oligopoly (of violence) with a dominant market leader is another inspiring notion 
originating from economic theory: some 60-80% of a given “market” may be controlled by 
the dominant leader, while the margins are left over for other entrepreneurs. The “rump 
state” might quite often find itself in a position of a weakened, but not yet collapsed state: 
its representatives completely control the capital and a certain perimeter outside of it, while 
some sub-contractors do not permanently provide security in zones under effective rule. 
Some indirect control over the sub-contractors and marginal entrepreneurs may be exerted 
by local allies of the state (e.g. “traditional” authorities, pro-government militias).  
Oligopolies based on arrangements represent less violent situations, while a stronger 
competition between violent actors is not just hypothetical. While competition might be 
“good” and normal for the classical markets observed by economists, differences might 
occur when it comes to security. Open competition between actors of violence leads to 
even more violence. The open “security market” offers few “advantages” for the 
“consumer”: There is usually no real freedom of choice between those violent actors 
capable of providing security. Only arrangements lead to relatively few acts of violence 
(“Oligopolistischer Sicherheitsmarkt” – Bakonyi 2001).  
The “imperfect market” provides incentives to particular strategies of the usurping actors 
involved. One obvious strategy is a rather direct and crude way to create demand for 
security by using violence (or threatening to do so) in the first place. When there is 
competition for dominance in a certain area, violence will be used (against the population, 
                                                 
3 A more “organized” form of policing by self-help groups can be imagined. A specific discussion on virtues and 
pitfalls of US-inspired “community policing” is beginning to assume shape (see Ruteere/Pommerolle 2003, Baker 
2007). South Africa and Kenya seem to be the most prominent African test-cases. 
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less the adversary) in a less restricted way. Furthermore a strategy of cooperative 
maximization of gains may lead to a cartel of violence: a small number of oligopolists find 
arrangements and provide the total amount of a given product/service (i.e.security). This 
strategy should lead to less outrage. But however it may mean that the provided service is 
either expensive to the client or of a bad quality, as rent-seeking is facilitated in cartel 
situations. Mehlum et al (2002: 448) argue that “in weak states violent entrepreneurs 
engage themselves in a rent-enhancing division of labor where the entrepreneurs go into 
both plundering and protection, squeezing the targets from two sides. This is the protection 
screw (…)”. But the nature of the good (security) and the nature of the strategies (using or 
at least threatening with violence) are rather different from the goods dealt with in 
economist textbooks: Therefore cartels of violence might be rare or ephemeral in practice. 
Another important qualification concerns the main motivational driving forces. Economic 
theory has a dominantly “homo oeconomicus” understanding of behavior. In emotionally 
charged conflict situations those motivations are not the only ones (Cramer 2002, 2006, 
Mkandawire 2002: 190, Richards/Vlassenroet 2002). Religious motives and habitual 
behavior may interfere or be even dominant. Nevertheless the current very prominent role 
of political economy explanations for war and violence are far too simplistic.4 However, the 
mechanisms of oligopolies sometimes have a high explanatory value for fuzzy situations in 
West Africa.  
Some authors have used the term “oligopoly of violence” without, however, defining and 
conceptualizing it. But how do they emerge? One interpretation focuses on the reaction to 
state despotism: The state is the source of arbitrariness and insecurity, and it is imperative 
to be protected from it (Waldmann 2002, Leander 2002, Bangoura 1996, Elwert 1999, von 
Trotha 2000). Von Trotha (2000) shows how traditional chiefs behave as protectors against 
a violent central authority and thus appropriate a regional monopoly of violence (“para-
statehood”). The second, opposing alternative is built on the inability of the state to impose 
its rule in central questions of sovereignty (monopolies of violence and taxes) against 
groups and individuals who compete for those privileges – a weak state may thus break 
down in the course of a struggle with competing actors of violence. In the final analysis, 
both explanations may not be contradictory – despotism is not to be confounded with a 
strong state. Quite to the contrary: it is a sign of weakness if violence has to be used 
frequently instead of its only use as a threat. 
 
2.3 Changing perspectives: Oligopolies of violence seen “from below” 
How are actors of violence perceived by the population? To answer that question, 
perspectives on the research topic need to be changed. Certainly, rationalities of violence 
actors differ significantly from those of the population, if we consider them as the victims of 
violence or beneficiaries of security services. To understand the ambiguous systemic logic 
as a whole, both the security provider’s as well as the security receiver’s rationalities need 
thus to be considered. 
The mixture of competition and complementarity of rules, claims and authorities is 
characteristic for emerging oligopolies. Bierschenk (1999: 339) gives a telling description of 
the city of Parakou (Benin), depicting the ambivalence of core actors as mediators in, and 
generators of conflict:  
                                                 
4 Collier/Hoeffler 2004a, Berdal/Malone 2000, Addison/Le Billon/ Murshed 2003, Jean/Rufin 1996. See the critical 
assessments of Marchal/Messiant 2002, Cramer 2002 and Mkandawire 2000 as well as the slightly more 
differentiated position in Collier et al. 2003. 
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“The area of conflict management can be seen as an oligopolistic service market 
that is characterized by competition for the competence of conflict management 
and the ambiguousness of decision-making processes. It is a market of aspirant-
mediators who are at the same time originators of conflict” (translation AM). 
In the disastrous cases – Benin would definitely not account for them, but rather Liberia or 
Sierra Leone – it could be argued that the population is not concerned at all by a debate on 
principles of international law that may still be entertained in development cooperation 
apparatuses, but which is far removed from their daily needs. The interest to survive and to 
secure the survival of the family is preponderant. A recent survey showed that 36% of all 
households in Abidjan were victims of acts of violence in 2001-2002 (26% in Lomé, 24% in 
Bamako, 23% in Cotonou and 21% in Niamey; Roubaud 2003: 72). Physical security is an 
essential need.  
When the state’s monopoly of violence is not or no longer (or only in an unacceptable way) 
enacted, the state (apparatus) becomes a burden for the population and loses its 
legitimacy. Furthermore it does not (or only inefficiently) deliver the expected services.5 In 
such a situation, private actors filling the gap might not be viewed as illegitimate per se. In 
a recent contribution, Biró (2007: 9) explored the possibility that even warlords provide a 
“modicum of public goods”, with security being the most prominent one. 
The caudillo, a figure in the political scene of many Latin American countries, may 
sometimes act in a comparable way, while the direct command over an armed gang is not 
relevant (Biró 2007: 28f). The ambiguous role of the “big man” is more familiar in African 
circumstances (e.g. when it comes to parties and elections). While land ownership is the 
essential capital of the caudillo, the big man may have a rather bigger variety of power 
assets and the access to the prince and a solid network of powerful relations as well. 
However, he is, first and foremost, always a patron in the clientelistic logic and therefore a 
protector. Essentially, one and the same person or organization may become both an 
agent of intimidation/repression and an agent of protection for different groups of the 
population or for the same group at different points in time. The ambivalence is obvious; 
perceptions oscillate between “violence actor” and “protector”. Tilly’s (1985: 171) 
categorical distinction between a racketeer and a legitimate protector may therefore miss 
the point.6 
Thus, – at least for specific parts of the population – oligopolies of violence can be 
legitimate because they are efficient and provide relative security. In addition they are 
considered to be the rule rather than the exception and based on certain traditions. This 
assumption is speculative as long as there are no quantitative surveys, which could 
measure empirical legitimacy. This was one of the aims of the research project described 
here. 
The threat or the potential force of protection has to be analyzed and defined by 
interviewing the population. Various participatory methods come to mind – in addition to 
opinion polls. Moser/McIlwaine (2004) use different types of charts in their approach of 
participatory urban appraisals to get a much better idea of the representations of danger. 
They systematically collected maps of dangerous places in urban Guatemala and 
                                                 
5 Increasingly, frequent violent protests in African cities against brutal and corrupt practices (e.g. in Abidjan and 
Douala; themselves frequently violently disbanded) may illustrate the problem. The quantitative survey by Roubaud 
for Abidjan shows that one of the most severely criticised public services concerns security/police (although 
education and urban infrastructure are rated even worse). Roubaud stresses the extremely diverging opinion of 
respondents, which he explains by the partisan behaviour of the police against the „nordist“ population. 
6 “Someone who produces both the good and, at a price, the shield against it is a racketeer. Someone who provides 
a needed shield but has little control over the danger’s appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector” (Tilly 1985: 
171). The term “little control” might need more specification. 
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Colombia; causal flow diagrams of different types of violence as drawn by groups of mainly 
young people; or perceptions of a violence actor such as the police in the form of a 
mapping exercise. Baker (2004: 170), working on different African countries, equally 
advocates and uses “participatory mapping as the tool to explore policing on the ground”. 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, we also successfully used a mapping technique to identify 
representations of the constellation of major violence actors by different groups. 
 
2.4  An outside perspective of oligopolies of violence  
As noted earlier, the readiness to accept alternatives to governments as partners in 
international relations must still be rated low. African state elites and their partner donor 
organizations rarely differ in their official world view on non-state armed groups. In 
individual cases the interaction with informal actors in the field of security may be left to 
Northern NGOs, who get discreet government funding and may dare to entertain 
communication with inter alia rebel forces. Official sources may be explored by using text 
analysis methods; interviews with officials may be conducted and will only rarely produce 
anything other than a firm belief or a formal confirmation of interstate cooperation, even 
when doubts concerning their effectiveness were voiced informally.  
The habitual leanings towards a Westphalian order, in which states and their more or less 
automatically deemed legitimate governments are the ones to negotiate with, are still very 
strong. A closer look at some arenas reveals, however, that first cracks have appeared. 
This is especially observable in Afghanistan, where donors and intervention troops 
entertain relationships of cooperation with individual warlords and militias (Schetter/Mielke 
2008: 83). 
In doing so, they de facto support oligopolies of violence (or at least more than one 
oligopolist). State actors are not the only outside forces interfering with local affairs on the 
“Westphalian periphery” (Biró 2007). In the literature on shadow states, the cross-border 
trade networks of warlords and armed groups play an important role. The works of William 
Reno have particularly contributed in elucidating these connections. Some elements of 
organized crime always play a role with this. The legalization of this sort of business by 
electing the warlord president – as happened with Charles Taylor in Liberia – is certainly 
an extreme case. 
What is largely absent from the academic debate, however, is a view from the inside, the 
constellation of actors of violence, their ways to compete and to cooperate, as well as their 
efforts to be legitimate. The view from outside, both by policymakers and academics, is still 
very much influenced by normative thinking. Deviations from the Weberian state are 
differing from the norm. However they are not always ignored, but when identified, they are 
marked as the sources of evil. Thus the rotten façade of the state, which one might 
consider to be still intact, is a much greater part of the problem than it is of the solution. 
 
2.5  Critique and discussion of the oligopolies of violence paradigm 
The concept as it is used here has received criticism during two project workshops 
organized in 2006 and 2007.7 The main argument advanced by critical colleagues was that 
the market analogy has limitations when it comes to security. There is indeed no doubt that 
                                                 
7 Both funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research, both held in Hamburg. The first (Security in the 
Context of Precarious Statehood, Hamburg, 14 July 2006) offered a review of current approaches on security 
beyond the state; the second (Hamburg, 19-20 March 2007) was a smaller project-related workshop on legitimate 
oligopolies of violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
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the contravening factors of habitual behavior, politics of belonging and charismatic factors 
pose limits to a pure rational-choice explanation that seems to underlie all market 
exchange relations. And all those contravening factors need to be explored case by case. 
However, with regard to the economic terminology chosen, it is important to stress that the 
oligopoly of violence perspective comes with an “imperfect security market” as groups and 
individuals looking for protection are probably not entirely free in choosing their security 
provider. This is, by the way, also true for most oligopolies in the ordinary sense meaning 
on capitalist markets. Oligopolies reduce the choice and the logic of the market; they 
represent imperfect markets. Thus, even by standards of this school of thought, a 100% 
rational behavior under those circumstances may not be expected. Therefore, it could be 
claimed that limited rationality is compatible with the market terminology and the paradigm 
of oligopolies of violence. Lambach (2007: 7) sees the usefulness of the concept primarily 
in the invitation to “consider the strategic environment in which armed groups (inter-)act, 
and which they create through their interaction.” 
There is more substance to the critique when turning to the expected weight of irrational 
motivations of actors, which has to be incorporated in some way: 
As noted: Not all violence actors/protectors/security providers have exclusively material 
motivations or would act purely rational (i.e. how can I maximize my influence and thereby 
political and material gain?). Culture, habit and identity related motivations of behavior are 
not negligible, particularly when it comes to the forms of violence used. Can these factors 
be weighed against rational behavior?  
Conversely, on the demand side, rational reflections are not the only ones at play (i.e. 
where can I find security for an acceptable price?). Pre-established preferences, based on 
cultural and political dispositions may have an important weight. Again, it seems 
impossible to isolate factors clearly and attribute measures of importance. 
However, and with those limitations, the term oligopoly of violence has many advantages 
compared to other concepts, including the paradigm of a “market of violence” (Elwert 
1999). It opens the analysis to diverging strategies of stakeholders, such as the 
“oligopolists” or the cost-benefit analysis of those looking for protection. The described 
sub-types of oligopolies described offer better frameworks of analysis suiting to the 
complex interplay of agency and structure. Oligopolies of violence establish themselves on 
a “security market” and not on a “market of violence”.   
It is undeniable that what is presented here picks up some ideas from the approaches and 
terminologies of von Trotha (2000). Von Trotha distinguishes between two basic forms of 
ordering violence - the order of violent self-help and the state with its claim of a monopoly 
on the use of force - and between four types of social orders of violence - the “neo-
despotic”, “para-state”, “post-acephelous-constitutional” and the “constitutional-welfare-
state” order - the purpose of the “oligopolies of violence” paradigm is to focus on the 
functional logic of a) the relations between the oligopolists themselves and b) between the 
oligopolist of violence and groups of the population.  
The “cultural anthropology” critique of von Trotha and Elwert also applies to the oligopolies 
of violence paradigm – as psychological approaches do postulate the use of violence as a 
non-purposeful act. Those approaches argue with either symbolic and habitual behavior or 
a disposition to violence (of individual perpetrators), for example. While individual behavior 
may be analyzed in this light, it is not helpful to explain social phenomena (of violence and 
security) of a size that we do not only face in Africa but in other regions of the world as 
well. Cultural and psychological explanations of violence get lost in very small spaces of 
validity and are certainly not satisfactory for anybody looking for universal validity. 
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One further critique has been voiced concerning the term “security as a good”. However, it 
must be noted that the use of the “public good” terminology when talking about security 
(employed, for example, by Luckham 1998) is not even debated by policymakers. In most 
OECD societies, both internal and external security are dealt with exactly from this 
perspective: as an indivisible, inclusive good, either to protect “the people” or “the nation”. 
Empirically, the evidence is not convincing, even in OECD countries. It might be tempting 
to transpose the suggested category of “collective good” from Africa to the developed 
world as well, where “gated communities” are a clear sign of the fading claim of the state to 
provide sufficient protection to all. The added value of this perspective is to enable a 
discussion of public or not so public goods from below, i.e. to leave the dominant discourse 
on security as the security of the state, its institutions and leaders behind. The democratic 
control of the security sector may be functioning more or less in OECD countries, yet it is 
certainly rare in African states, in which the colonial imprint on police and armies meant 
distance and a primary mission to repress unrest from below. Therefore this is not at all a 
recent development or a consequence of the supposedly ongoing privatization of violence. 
The discussion of security as a public or collective good has important implications. It helps 
in formulating an “entitlement to be protected” which may be the essential element of a 
security concept “from below” and at the same time is rarely a well-established perspective 
of elites on security. The actual scope of security provision does not meet the requirements 
in the societies that are analyzed in this study. An implicit pressure to state elites to better 
satisfy the demand arises as consequence. But the questions have to be taken further: It is 
of vital interest to know how much security is provided by whom and for whom in this 
situation of critical shortage. From this perspective, another research objective emerges: to 
analyze and describe better the forms of interconnection, of antagonistic rivalry or mere 
competition as well as patterns of cooperation between different actors of 
violence/protectors. A “patchwork structure” (Lock 2004) of such actors can indeed be 
expected, but this description still needs more analytical depth. And one may expect 
further dynamic changes: From a political science perspective, it is of special interest 
whether interrelations between violent actors can be institutionalized and serve as the 
beginning of a state-building process from the bottom-up. Furthermore, the empirical 
legitimacy of a political order beyond the state would be of interest for further research. 
Only opinion polls could deliver a solid base for judgments on legitimacy; in their absence 
some room for speculation still remain. Our own research on oligopolies of violence in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone made clear that it is possible to get a clear picture of the popular 
appraisal of main actors of violence. It was, however, difficult to come up with a general 
appreciation of an existing oligopoly of violence as a political order. Fluidity is another 
conceptual problem: Although an oligopoly of violence is not an unremovable system as 
competition between the oligopolists on “market shares” continues, the actors frequently 
transform themselves, become more or less exchangeable towards the surrounding 
population or more or less responsive. Longitudinal analyses of violent actors (see e.g. 
Rodgers 2007 on Latin American youth gangs or Meagher 2007 on the Bakassi Boys) 
support this theory. 
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3.  The case studies (Liberia and Sierra Leone) 
 
3.1  Case selection and aspects of comparison  
The comparative case study method was applied for selecting the two post-conflict 
societies of Liberia and Sierra Leone as field research sites. The cases were considered 
comparable because they shared certain contextual similarities while at the same time 
being at various stages of post-conflict reform and (re)construction: 
1. Foremost, both West African countries had emerged from civil war and were thus 
formally considered post-conflict societies;  
2. In both countries, numerous security actors have been vying for control and influ-
ence for several decades;  
3. The national army and police were never able to establish or maintain a state mo-
nopoly on the use of force for any significant period of time;  
4. Local civil defense forces, rebel groups and secret societies dominated the securi-
ty sector in the hinterland. For citizens, these various actors could act as protec-
tors but could also pose a threat; 
5. Both have not only witnessed protracted phases of violence, but also actors from 
neighboring countries have also played a major role during periods of conflict es-
calation (e.g. through the deployment of mercenaries). 
6. A final similarity between the two cases was the extensive involvement of interna-
tional actors during the post-conflict phases, particularly the United Nations with its 
peacekeeping missions UNMIL and UNAMSIL.8 Though the intentions and 
achievements of the intervention troops (especially ECOMOG)9 remain questiona-
ble, they were, nonetheless, ultimately successful in imposing a much-needed 
peace, largely through the use of force. 
The two case studies were chosen due to the empirical evidence of the presence of 
oligopolies of violence and their related dynamics. At first sight the prevalence of a number 
of different types of security actors could be detected. Both countries experienced 
important transformations in the field of security since the end of their civil wars. 
Furthermore a continuing ambivalence of the security sector in the perceptions of the 
populations in the respective countries can be observed. Moreover, the fact that the post-
conflict phase in Sierra Leone lasts longer than that of Liberia facilitates the identification of 
the dynamics – i.e. emergence and transformation – of both positive and negative security 
actors in post-conflict societies. The cases were compared using three different analytical 
levels: 
• Diachronic: comparing along the timeline between the past and the present 
situation in both countries. i.e. Liberia just before the end of the civil war in 2003 
compared to the period from 2003-2006 during the so-called “peacebuilding” 
phase. Sierra Leone before the end of its civil war in 2001 in comparison to both 
the period from 2001-2005 (the “peacebuilding” phase with heavy international 
involvement – up until the withdrawal of the last UN troops) as well as the period 
after the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping force in 2006. 
                                                 
8 United Nations Mission in Liberia and United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, respectively. 
9 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group. 
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• Diachronic-binary: refers to the comparison of both countries as they emerged 
from violent conflict compared to the situation prior to the cessation of conflict, i.e. 
between Sierra Leone as it emerged from violent conflict at the turn of the 
millennium to Liberia as it is today. 
• Synchronic: a comparison of the current situation in both countries. 
The two country cases were subjected to a structured and focused comparison. The focus 
of the comparison includes a selected aspect of each of the cases, i.e. the security sector. 
The structure, however, covers the same set of research questions which were posed for 
both cases (George and Bennett 2005: 67f):  
1. Which actors or groups of actors provide for both, personal and national security?  
2. What modes of interaction exist between these various security actors? Are these 
relationships cooperative or hostile? 
3. How has the security situation changed compared to how it was before the end of 
the civil war? And how is it perceived today? 
4. Which security actors are considered as a threat, and which are considered valu-
able for ensuring security? In other words, do citizens in need of security per-
ceived the actions of particular actors legitimate? 
 
3.2  Methods 
The field research that was conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone provided empirically 
based insights into the existence of oligopolies of violence in societies emerging from 
conflict. The study took a mixed-methods approach to collect data, combining both 
quantitative and qualitative tools to summon empirical information on the status of the 
security sector in both case studies. Field research was placed in both countries over a 
period of three months each.10 The following qualitative and quantitative methods were 
used:  
• A survey poll was carried out in three urban areas in both countries;  
• Four in-depth focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in each country;  
• Approximately 60 focused, semi-structured interviews were conducted with elites 
as well as with national and international experts  
• The available non-conventional literature and key documents (“grey literature”, 
e.g. internal reports, government documents, newsletters, fact sheets, crime 
statistics) were gathered to substantiate the performance of security actors. 
As a typical quantitative data-gathering tool, the survey poll enables the generalization of 
findings to the population from which a sample is drawn, with the samples generally being 
larger than that for qualitative research. A total of 700 respondents were interviewed in 
three urban areas in each of the two countries. In Liberia, the capital Monrovia (500) and 
the two second-largest cities Tubmanburg and Buchanan (100 each) were selected. In 
Sierra Leone, interviews were conducted in the cities of Freetown (500), Makeni (100) and 
Koidu Town (100). Due to practical consideration, field researches were limited to urban 
areas; therefore the results reflect the perceptions of each country’s urban population. 
However, people who had migrated from the hinterland participated in the focus group 
                                                 
10 Fieldwork in Liberia was carried out from late November 2005 to mid-February 2006, the field research in Sierra 
Leone followed a few months later from early April until the end of June 2006. 
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discussions, thus enabling an – albeit partial – impression of conditions in the rural areas.11 
To ensure that the sample was representative, four suburbs were selected within each city. 
In addition, interviewers applied a randomized technique for the selection of the interviewer 
teams, starting points and households. In order to guarantee a gender balance, every 
second respondent had to be of a female gender.12 
The survey was intended to give an impression of the perceptions of general and personal 
security of the urban citizens in each country, as well as revealing citizens’ assessment of 
different security actors regarding their role in providing public and personal security. The 
questionnaire included a number of items on the socioeconomic background of 
respondents, allowing a more differentiated analysis of the security needs and the 
perceptions in terms of various criteria such as age, gender, ethnic group, religion and 
occupation. 
Focus group discussions are a data collection tool that utilizes the interaction in a group 
discussion as a source of data, with the researcher playing an active role in creating the 
group discussion for the purposes of collecting data (Morgan 1996: 129). The FGDs, con-
ducted during the field researches, zoomed in on security perceptions and included issues 
such as security actors involved in providing or threatening security. The FGDs identified 
as well the relationships between the various actors. In both countries, four focus group 
discussions were held, each comprising 6-8 participants. Concerning the moderation of the 
focus groups, the distinctiveness of the settings under study – subject sensitivity, language 
barrier (local dialect) – no researcher from the core team (DSF project members) occupied 
the role of the moderator. Instead, an experienced local moderator was employed. 
Careful consideration was also made concerning the composition of the groups. In both 
countries, four FGDs were held, each comprising six to eight participants. Discussants 
were chosen according to two criteria: the members of each respective group had to be 1) 
homogeneous and 2) virtual. The first criterion denotes similarities among each group’s 
participants in terms of their social, educational and economic background. Hence one 
FGD included people from the educational sector (“teachers and students”). The second 
FDG’s members were all (previously) employed in the health sector (“health workers”). The 
third discussion group was conducted amongst market women (“market women”) whilst 
members of the last group were either community or youth leaders (“community and youth 
leaders”). The second criterion – namely that the groups had to be virtual as opposed to 
real – merely meant that debaters within each group should not be familiar with each other. 
The composition of the focus groups was intended to reduce the risk of status-related bar-
riers or entrenched roles unduly influencing participants’ responses.  
Each round of discussion lasted one day. During that time it was possible to explore the 
assumed motivation and legitimacy of the actors as well as other issues relevant to the 
security sector. A systematic comparison with the security situation in the past (i.e. before 
the end of the civil wars) was initiated in order to map the extent of the transformation in 
the configuration of actors.  
The key outcome of the FGDs was a graphical mapping of security actors which shall de-
pict the identity and relative significance of and the interactions between these various 
actors. 
Semi-structured interviews – a classic form of data collection in political science – were 
conducted with local elites as well as local and international experts. This included security 
                                                 
11 For details on the composition of the focus groups, see below.  
12 Guidelines to the Liberian and Sierra Leonean interviewers for randomizing the survey included further provisions 
not detailed here. 
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actors such as representatives of the national security forces, traditional societies and 
private security companies. Unlike the specific questions posed in the survey, the 
interviews were guided by a set of open-ended, semi-structured questions. The interviews 
conducted with elites, such as local government representatives, traditional authorities and 
key representatives from civil society, enabled a comparison of perceptions “from below” 
with those “from above”.  
 
3.3  Results of the Field Research 
Table 1 below reveals that, by and large, there has been a predictably dramatic shift in 
security perceptions of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans compared to the period prior to the 
end of their respective civil wars (Table 1). In both cases, a significant number of 
respondents considered their personal security situation to be “somewhat better” or “much 
better” (90.8% total in Sierra Leone; 86.1% total in Liberia). Similar results were obtained 
regarding public security.  
 
Table 1: Perceptions of Security in Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone: Past and Present Compared 
 General Security (in %)* Personal Security (in %)** 
 Liberia  Sierra Leone Liberia Sierra Leone
Much better 33.7 31.8 28.4 27.4 
Somewhat better 51.3 60 57.7 63.4 
No Change 6.3 4.6 5.6 4.4 
Worse 4.4 2.1 4.6 2.6 
Much worse 2.6 0.4 2.4 1.6 
No answer 1.7 1.1 1.3 0.7 
N (Liberia) = 698; N (Sierra Leone) = 702  
* Question: “In your opinion, compared to before the end of the last war, what is the general state of security 
like in the country today?“ 
** Question: “Compared to before the end of the last war, how is your personal safety today?“ 
 
The end of the civil war in Liberia (2003) is more recent than in Sierra Leone (1999). We 
have no clear data on whether the security situation as perceived by the citizens had steadily 
improved before. While our one-off survey can only create a snapshot of the particular 
security situation at a given point in time, a tentative conclusion would be that the period 
extending from the peace agreement to the moment of our opinion poll is relevant to build a 
sense of security.  
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Table 2: Perceptions of Security in Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone: Present Situation 
 General Security (in %)* Personal Security (in %)** 
 Liberia  Sierra Leone Liberia Sierra Leone 
Very safe 20.3 14.7  25.6 20.7 
It’s okay 40.1 32.3 43.7 40.9 
Fairly unsafe 26.9 37.9 23.5 27.5 
Not safe at all 10.5 13.4 6.2 10.3 
No answer 2.2 1.7 1.0 0.7 
N (Liberia) = 698; N (Sierra Leone) = 702  
* Question: “In your opinion, how safe is the country today?“ 
** Question: “How safe do you feel personally in the country today?“ 
 
Table 2 shows that despite significant progress, the general perception in both countries is 
that security is still not guaranteed. In contrast to the results from Table 1, Table 2 shows 
that the relative success is not matched with an absolute sense of security, as Sierra Leone 
fares worse in the eyes of the (urban) population – both in general as well as in personal 
terms. 
Regarding the existence and identification of actors that provide security in the post-conflict 
setting, the comparison of the two case studies produced the following four key results:  
First, the intervention of an external peacekeeping force had a resounding impact on the 
security arena in these post-conflict settings. The international actors have taken the lead 
in providing security in both countries as they each emerged from civil war. In Liberia, for 
instance, the international peacekeeping force – the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) – was considered to be the most important security provider by an overwhelming 
majority of survey poll respondents. As many as 75.9% considered UNMIL to be the most 
important security actor in the country, and 94.9% considered them to be either “very 
important” or “somewhat important” for their personal security (compare Tables 3 and 4).13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The first figure (75.9%) is based on an open-ended question from the survey, i.e. the question was posed in such a 
way as to encourage the respondents to name the most important group in each case without being influenced or 
guided towards any particular answer. If respondents had been asked to choose from a list of specific actors, one 
may have unwittingly excluded certain actors who in fact play a key role in security from the respondents' 
perspective. These results were tested with a second, “closed” question: through multiple-choice options, 
respondents were asked to rate each listed actor according to its impact – both positive and negative – on their 
security, as illustrated by the second figure (94.9%). 
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Table 3: Perceptions of Security Actors in Urban Liberia: Most Important Actors 
Actors  Percentage 
UNMIL 75.9 
Liberia National Police (LNP) 17.9 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 2 
Ex-Combatants 0.1 
ECOWAS 0.1 
Poro/Sandee 0.1 
Vigilante Teams 0.1 
Family 0.1 
No answer/don’t know 3.4 
N: 698, Question: “We have spoken to many Liberians and they all have different feelings 
about which groups in the country protect them and which are a threat to them. Could you 
please tell us which group is the most important one for your personal safety?” 
 
Table 4: Perceptions of Security Actors in Urban Liberia (ranked in %) 
Types of Actors  very/somewhat 
important to 
personal 
security 
does not 
affect my 
personal 
security  
somewhat/a 
big threat to 
personal 
security 
International  UNMIL 94.9 2 1.4 
State  Liberia National Police 91.9 4.6 2.9 
Armed Forces of 
Liberia 
64.8 23.8 9.3 
International/ 
commercial non-
state  
Private Security 
Companies  
38.3 52.2 3.8 
Domestic non-State Community Watch 
Teams 
56.6 17.9 15.5 
Poro/Secret Societies 15.7 46.4 26.1 
Political Party Militias 7.2 36.3 42.8 
Street Boys 0.4 6.3 78.6 
Ex-Combatants 3.3 6.9 86.8 
N = 698; Question: “Now, I’m going to read out a list of groups which are said to affect security in one way 
or another. For each one, could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened by them or not?” 
Percentages of ‘don’t know’ and ‘no answer’ responses are not shown in the table. 
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Findings from the FGDs further demonstrated the prominence of UNMIL in the perception 
of the population. In the mapping exercises that were conducted as part of the discussion, 
participants were asked, among other questions, to identify the various security actors as 
either positive or negative, that is, whether they provided security or condoned violence. 
UNMIL featured prominently in all four mapping exercises and was identified as positive in 
three, with only the fourth group unable to agree on the role that the peacekeepers played. 
In Sierra Leone, the external actors featured less prominently in the security arena. Table 4 
shows that, here, the external actors – UNAMSIL, ECOMOG, and IMATT14 – did not play 
as significant a role in the provision of security. Although some respondents still 
considered them to be the most important security providers, they were considerably less 
prominent than their Liberian counterparts.  
A second, and certainly the most remarkable finding was the relatively favorable 
perception of the state security actors in both cases under study. State security actors – 
both the police and the military forces – received surprisingly positive ratings despite 
obvious shortcomings in terms of equipment and training as well as their general history of 
violence and oppression. These perceptions are most probably less a reflection of these 
actors’ actual performance, but can in fact be interpreted as an indication of the high 
expectations citizens have towards these actors. There is little doubt that there is a 
pronounced preference for state security actors to provide for security in both countries 
As illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, most urban dwellers in Liberia, if left to choose, would 
prefer the state's own security forces – the Liberia National Police (LNP) and the Armed 
Forces of Liberia (AFL) – instead of informal or private security actors. Yet the fairly 
favorable assessment of the AFL can hardly be attributed to their actual performance, due 
to their current reorganization.15 This is partly reflected in the finding that while some 20% 
believed the armed forces had no impact on their security, almost two-thirds regarded the 
AFL as important for their personal security. This seemed to reflect a wish among the 
respondents for the AFL to play a prominent role rather than a rating of their actual 
performance. In our opinion, the relative importance allotted to the AFL in Table 3 is not 
due to previous experiences with government troops, but in fact indicates the expectations 
of respondents in terms of the future role to be played by this actor. 
As in Liberia, the Sierra Leone government and its security forces scored high in the 
respondents’ expectations for the provision of national security (see Table 5). Unlike in 
Liberia, however, the armed forces of Sierra Leone were not dissolved, but undergone 
extensive retraining over the past five years. Surprisingly, it was the fact that the Republic 
of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) stayed out of sight and soldiers were confined to 
their barracks that accounts for the focus group discussants’ favorable assessment. This to 
some extent explains why over 80% of survey poll respondents considered the RSLAF as 
“very” or “somewhat” important for their personal security, despite the violent, even 
criminal, history of the military in the country.  
                                                 
14 The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
and the (British-led) International Military Advisory and Training Team, respectively. 
15 A note as regards our inclusion of the AFL in the multiple-choice question, despite its dissolution, is due here. Prior 
to the implementation of the survey, discussions with our project partners revealed that the AFL was considered as 
a significant security actor, hence its inclusion in our questionnaire.  
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Table 5: Perceptions of Security Actors in Urban Sierra Leone: Most Important Actors 
Actors Percentage 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 34.5 
Police 33.2 
UNAMSIL 10.8 
ECOMOG 3 
Government 2 
Former Warring Faction 1: CDF 1.6 
Husband/family/individual 1 
God 1 
Rebel/Ex-Combatant 0.9 
President 0.9 
Youth Groups 0.6 
Foreign troops (general) 0.4 
Traditional Authorities (Paramount Chief/village authorities) 0.3 
Private Security 0.3 
SLP Operational Support Division 0.3 
IMATT 0.1 
Mende 0.1 
Former Warring Faction 2: RUF 0.1 
Other  1 
None 0.7 
No answer/Don’t know 7.2 
N: 702, Question: “We have spoken to many Sierra Leoneans and they all have different 
feelings about which groups in the country protect them and which are a threat to them. 
Could you please tell us which group is the most important one for your personal safety?” 
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Table 6: Perceptions of Security Actors in Urban Sierra Leone  
(ranked in %) 
Types of Actors  very/somewhat 
important to 
personal 
security 
does not 
affect my 
personal 
security  
somewhat/a 
big threat to 
personal 
security 
State 
Sierra Leone Police 87.8 3.4 8 
Rep. of SL Armed 
Forces 
81.4 5 10 
 Mines Monitoring Officers 
22.7 55 5.2 
 Traffic Wardens 51.2 34 7.9 
International/ 
commercial non-
state 
Private Security 
Companies 
54.6 38.6 1.6 
Domestic non-state 
Secret Societies 26.6 50.9 19.7 
Youth Wings of Pol. 
Parties 
30.6 33.5 30.3 
Ghetto Boys 4.4 16.2 76.8 
Bike Riders 39.1 30.1 26.6 
West Side Boys 2.9 17 74.6 
Civil Defence Forces 20.5 20.5 54.1 
Revolutionary United 
Front 
2.3 16.1 78 
N = 702; Percentages of ‘Don’t know’ and ‘no answer’ responses not shown in table. Question: “Now, I’m 
going to read out a list of groups that are said to affect security in one way or another. For each one, could 
you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened by them?” 
 
Focus group discussants had a relatively negative opinion of the Sierra Leone Police 
(SLP). This deviates from the positive ratings given to the SLP in the survey poll, where 
71.1% of respondents considered them to be very important for their personal security. 
Interviews conducted with local and international experts on security-related issues 
revealed that, despite their high expectations about the role of national security forces, 
Sierra Leoneans were very aware of the shortcomings of police forces in particular. As with 
their Liberian counterparts, the SLP receive external support and training, in this case from 
the Commonwealth Police and the civilian police section of UNAMSIL. However, their 
ability to perform their duties is hampered by a lack of equipment and insufficient 
remuneration for their services. 
Thirdly, and as noted above, the field research confirmed the existence and significance of 
non-state security actors, particularly following the withdrawal of the external peacekeeping 
forces. Since the departure of the last contingent of UNAMSIL troops in December 2005, 
which had provided for the bulk of security during its deployment in urban Sierra Leone, 
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informal security actors have come to play a more significant role in the security arena. 
Given that the fieldwork was conducted shortly after UNAMSIL’s withdrawal, the 
sustainability of the current post-conflict phase cannot be verified. However, the results 
reveal the significant vacuum left by the multinational forces and exposes the inability of 
the national security forces to fill it.  
The comparison of security perceptions after the war with and without UNAMSIL’s 
presence reflects a shift in respondents’ attitudes marked by UNAMSIL’s withdrawal. The 
mapping exercises in the focus groups produced some striking results and led to the 
identification of additional actors who were considered relevant in the security sector; most 
prominent among them were the Community Watch Teams. When the various maps - 
depicting the security actors in Sierra Leone over the last five years - were compared, it 
was apparent that far fewer actors were providing security in Sierra Leone during the 
involvement of UNAMSIL than compared to the situation since the mission’s withdrawal. 
Similarly, more actors were involved in the period before 2001, prior to the end of the civil 
war (Table 7). This implies that with the presence of UN troops, the need for security was 
covered. Moreover, the withdrawal of UNAMSIL troops produced a security vacuum that 
was not filled by state actors but rather by private, non-state actors. Some of them have 
only been established recently – such as the Police Partnership Boards or the Community 
Night Watch, while others have “re-emerged” – such as the secret societies (Poro and 
Sowei). The Table on the next page lists all the security actors identified by focus group 
discussants since 2001.16  
Finally, the most clear-cut parallel between the two countries in terms of non-state actors 
can be drawn with regard to informal groups of young men – such as ex-combatants, 
Street Boys and Ghetto Boys – who were undoubtedly considered as the most serious 
threats. This finding also points to the urgent need to (re-)integrate them into society by 
creating job opportunities. However it is obvious that both Liberia and Sierra Leone face 
similar challenges in the social and economic arena in tackling the eradication of violent 
conflict.  
In Liberia, an overwhelming majority of 86.8% perceived ex-combatants to be a threat or a 
“big threat” to their personal security. Similar clear-cut results were obtained for the Street 
Boys, whom 78.6% considered to be a threat or big threat (see Table 2). 
In Sierra Leone, the Ghetto Boys, many of whom are ex-combatants, were given the worst 
ratings: more than half of the respondents considered them as a big threat to their personal 
security. Likewise, 74.6% of respondents considered the West Side Boys – a rogue army 
faction that emerged at the end of the 1990s but which has been officially disbanded – to 
be a threat or a big threat to their security. The focus groups confirmed these views, and 
discussants agreed that the West Side Boys were capable of recruiting and reorganizing at 
any given time. 
                                                 
16 Note that in transferring the information into a table, the level of interaction between the various security actors 
could not be illustrated. For an example of a diagram depicting this information, see Figure 2 below.  
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All mapping exercises conducted in the FGDs confirmed that the security arena in each 
country comprises a group of partly competing, partly cooperating actors (see e.g. Figure 
2). In other words, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the security market can be 
characterized as an oligopoly of violence. 
 
Table 7: Mapping of Security Actors in Urban Sierra Leone – Change over Time  
Period External State Non-State 
Before 2001 - ECOMOG (P) 
- Executive 
Outcomes(D) 
- SLP Operational 
Support Division 
(OSD)(P) 
- Chiefdom Police(P) 
- Police(D) 
- Sierra Leone Army(D) 
- City Council Police(D) 
- Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) (N) 
- Private Security 
Companies(P) 
- Civil Defence Unit 
(Youth) (P) 
- Gbethis(P) 
- CDF (N) 
- RUF (N) 
 
2001 – Dec. 
2005 
- UNAMSIL(P) - Chiefdom Police(P)
- OSD(P) 
- Police(D) 
- City Council Police(D) 
- RSLAF(D) 
- Private Security 
Companies(P) 
Since January 
2006 
 - RSLAF(P)
- Chiefdom Police(P) 
- OSD(D) 
- Council(D) 
- Police(N) 
- Community(P)
- Chief(P)  
- Headman(P) 
- Soweis(P) 
- Community Night 
Watch(D) 
- Market Women(D) 
- Ojeh(D) 
- Poro(D) 
- Hunter militia(D) 
Source: FGD2 Sierra Leone, Teachers & Students;  
P = positive; D = disputed; N = neutral 
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Figure 2: Mapping of Security Actors in Urban Liberia Today 
17 <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/>. 
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4.  The Desk Study 
 
4.1  Comparative design and hypotheses 
In order to assess whether the data obtained from the field researches were representative 
of post-conflict societies in general or whether Liberia and Sierra Leone were – in some 
ways – special cases, a desk study of other post-conflict situations was conducted. Initially, 
a sample of six additional cases was selected: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Guatemala, Nigeria (the Sharia riots), Pakistan (the Sindh/Karachi conflict) and 
Somaliland. These cases were drawn from Chojnacki’s Warlist (2005) and the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP)17 which were coded as having ended by 2004. They were 
selected to represent as many cases as possible: from large-scale wars (Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Guatemala, Somaliland) to low-intensity conflicts (Nigeria, Pakistan). In two of the 
additional cases (Afghanistan, Bosnia), an international military intervention had been 
conducted; in the other four, it had not. In each case, the security market was analyzed 
three to four years after the end of conflict. This timeframe was chosen to allow a 
comparison of the results with data gathered in field researches in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia between 2005 and 2006. It also represents a point where post-conflict structures 
have begun to solidify. Several hypotheses about the determinants of the outcome variable 
(the structure of the security market) were formulated. Data was gathered from secondary 
literature and through a series of semi-structured interviews with German-based country 
experts. 
Comparison between cases followed a Most Similar/Most Different Systems Design 
(MSSD/MDSD). Liberia and Sierra Leone were compared with Bosnia and Afghanistan 
through the lens of an MSSD logic. In these cases two key variables (intensity of conflict, 
presence of international troops) were held constant, therefore any variation on the 
dependent variable must be attributed to other variables. As a second step, these four 
cases were then compared with Guatemala, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somaliland. The use of 
the MDSD approach meant that variation of independent variables could be discounted as 
the outcome variables remained the same between cases from both groups. 
Results from this first round of analysis were inconclusive due to the high level of variation 
between cases. It was particularly difficult to compare the low-intensity conflicts with other 
cases in any meaningful way. However, discarding these cases meant that the remaining 
number of cases was too low (and too biased towards the MSSD group) for an extensive 
test of the hypotheses. However, it also became apparent that cases could be divided into 
three groups as a working typology of post-conflict societies: high-intensity conflict with 
international military intervention (Type I), high-intensity conflict without intervention (Type 
II), and low-intensity conflict (Type III) (see Table 8). 
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Table 8: Types of Post-Conflict Countries 
 Intervention No Intervention 
High Intensity Type I Type II 
Low Intensity --- Type III 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
To support these preliminary results, a second round of case studies was conducted. First 
of all, there was a need to add further cases from types II and III since the present number 
(two cases each) was too small to confidently assert the typology’s validity. Case studies 
were conducted on Peru (Type II), Niger (the Tuareg conflict) and Mexico (Chiapas) (both 
Type III). Results clearly indicated a high level of intra-type similarity. Thereafter, a 
decision was taken to only test hypotheses within a given type in order to minimize the 
number of possible explanatory variables. Three additional cases were added to the four 
Type I cases already analyzed in the first part: Kosovo, Mozambique and Cambodia (see 
Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Post-Conflict Societies by Type 
Type Country Conflict Timespan Intervention Intensity
I  
‘High Intensity, 
External 
Intervention’ 
Afghanistan 1979-2001 Yes High 
Bosnia- 1992-1995 Yes High 
Cambodia 1979-1991 Yes High 
Kosovo 1998-1999 Yes High 
Liberia 1990-1996, 2001- Yes High 
Mozambique 1979-1992 Yes High 
Sierra Leone 1991-2002 Yes High 
II 
‘High Intensity, No 
intervention’ 
Guatemala 1962-1995 No High 
Peru 1981-1999 No High 
Somalia 
(Somaliland) 
1988-1991 No High 
III 
‘Low Intensity’ 
Mexico (Chiapas) 1994-1995 No Low 
Niger (Tuareg) 1990-1995 No Low 
Nigeria (Sharia 1999-2003 No Low 
Pakistan (Mohajir) 1994-1997 No Low 
Source: Own compilation based on Chojnacki 2005, UCDP database, Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF) database18 
                                                 
18 <http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/index.htm>. 
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The following hypotheses were tested: 
 
H1: Intervention troops are market leaders or monopolists. 
H1 is based on the assumption that intervention forces are usually of sufficient strength to 
quickly assert dominance on the security market. This proceeds from the international 
community’s preferred strategy of “saturating” a post-conflict country with troops to deter 
would-be spoilers from attacking the international forces. In addition, intervention troops 
are usually better armed, better trained, and better led than most non-state armed actors, 
further improving their leverage on the market. 
 
H2: Peace agreements increase market concentration and/or improve the quality of 
interaction. 
This hypothesis derives from the assumption that a peace agreement supports the 
eventual emergence of a monopoly of violence either through the demobilization of fighters 
or their integration into a national army. A peace agreement is also supposed to reduce 
inter-group hostility, making interaction between market actors less conflictual, e.g. via 
power-sharing accords. 
 
H3: DDR programs support market concentration. 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs reduce the potential of 
all participating parties to employ violence. Since those programs never target all conflict 
actors equally, the market position of particular parties (usually state forces or international 
troops) is strengthened relatively to the position of others. 
 
H4a: The higher the number of parties to the conflict, the lower the market concentration 
and the more conflictual the relations. 
H4a claims that a fragmented, non-cooperative market will basically stay the same during 
the transition from the conflict to the post-conflict phase. This is based on the observation 
that conflicts destroy social capital and leave a legacy of inter-group tension that is difficult 
to overcome. The higher the number of actors, the higher the degree of uncertainty on the 
market; which in turn acts as a disincentive to cooperation. Instead, the hypothesis argues 
that small groups of actors will entrench themselves and try to stabilize their market 
position. 
 
H4b: The higher the number of parties to the conflict, the higher the market concentration. 
This hypothesis is the opposite of H4a. It proceeds from the assumption that a fragmented 
security market is easier to dominate for intervention forces, since individual parties are of 
insufficient strength to resist the intervention troops’ attempt to gain a share in the market. 
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The variables were defined as follows: 
 
Market Structure 
An oligopoly is present as long as no actor is able to dominate the market, but also when 
only a few (operationalized as: no more than six) actors control significant market shares 
on the national level. Since market share is impossible to measure on the security market, 
alternative indicators for market dominance are necessary: In a case in which a single 
actor dominates the market, other actors will avoid direct confrontation with the market 
leader while defending their ability to exert violence and provide security. A monopoly is 
present where only a single actor maintains a sizeable armed force on the national level. 
 
Types of Interaction 
Interaction is conflictual when there are frequent violent clashes between at least two of 
the major market actors. Where such clashes occur infrequently, interaction was labeled 
as conflictual-neutral. However interaction is neutral, as long as violence between major 
actors is very rare. Hostility is still widespread, but does not lead to fighting; actors are 
mostly segregated from each other. A cooperative-neutral mode of interaction includes (a) 
the absence of violence between major actors, and (b) frequent contacts between actors. 
Finally, in a cooperative market, major actors frequently interact in good faith and 
sometimes coordinate actions.  
 
DDR 
DDR was coded as ‘Yes’ where all major parties agreed on a DDR program (or submitted 
to an international one) and where no party defected from the program. This includes DDR 
programs which were targeted to particular (usually non-state) actors – not every actor has 
to be affected equally by a DDR program which would be considered then as successful 
for the purposes of this analysis. A ‘partial’ DDR program describes cases in which DDR 
was not wholly effective, usually because actors hid weapons and kept fighters from being 
demobilized. The variable was coded as ‘No’ when actors defected from the DDR program 
or where not all major actors were included in such a program. 
 
Peace Agreement 
This variable is coded as ‘Yes’ if a peace agreement is in place that all conflict parties have 
ratified. If such an agreement is absent or has not been accepted by all parties or excludes 
certain major actors (such as the Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan of 2001 where the 
Taliban had been excluded from the negotiations), it is coded as ‘No’. 
 
Number of Parties to the Previous Conflict 
This variable is coded as ‘Low’ if there were only two major actors (or stable alliances of 
actors) during the conflict, as ‘Medium’ if there were three or four major actors, and as 
‘High’ if there were five or more major factions to the conflict. 
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4.2  Results of the Desk Study 
The results of the desk study are presented in Table 10 on the next page. In five out of 
seven cases, a market leader had emerged three to four years after the end of conflict. In 
three cases, the market leader was an international intervention force; in the other two, it 
was the respective government of the country following the withdrawal of international 
troops. The other two cases, Afghanistan and Cambodia, were characterized by 
oligopolies of violence and a return to conflict, albeit on a lower level and less openly than 
before the intervention. However central conflict actors (the Taliban and the Khmer Rouge, 
respectively) rejected peace and continued fighting. Types of interaction covered the 
spectrum from conflictual to cooperative-neutral relations. Cooperative interaction could 
not be observed. 
As for the hypotheses, H1 is partly confirmed. In three cases, international troops were 
market leaders at the time of observation, in another two (Mozambique and Sierra Leone) 
they had been leaders before they were withdrawn and had handed over market 
dominance to government actors. However, Afghanistan and Cambodia contradict this 
hypothesis. Therefore, additional conditions seem to be necessary for intervention forces 
to successfully exert market dominance. A monopolization of force by external actors could 
not be observed and seems very unlikely in most post-conflict settings.19 This observation 
should make decision-makers cautious against false optimism that the impact of 
intervention troops can provide sustainability. 
The proposition that a peace agreement contributes to market concentration and the 
peacefulness of interaction (H2) is also partly confirmed. In contrast to H1, only Cambodia 
contradicts this hypothesis. The 1991 Paris Agreement provided a basis for peace and had 
been signed by all major conflict parties. However, the Khmer Rouge defected from the 
agreement in 1992 when they found themselves sidelined after a realignment of political 
forces on the eve of UNTAC’s (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) 
deployment. As a result, the hypothesis could be modified to say that ‘working’ peace 
agreements (i.e. including accords that are respected by all actors) have the desired effect. 
Unfortunately, the observation - peace agreements that are respected by all sides lead to 
amicable relations - is tautological and, hence, worthless. 
H3 is confirmed in a very straightforward manner. The data shows that if a DDR program 
was at least partially successful, the security market was dominated by a market leader. 
However, the direction of causality is unclear: on the one hand, a DDR program 
contributes to market concentration by reducing the capacity of spoilers to employ 
violence, on the other hand, however an international force that dominates the market may 
be able to coerce other actors into submitting to a DDR process. Actually, this second 
proposition seems more likely, since DDR programs are generally only implemented after 
the intervention force has been fully deployed. 
It cannot be confirmed with certainty whether the number of parties to the previous conflict 
has any effect on the post-conflict security market in one way or another (H4a and H4b). A 
higher number of parties seem to be associated with a less concentrated market due to the 
higher number of potential spoilers, but the relationship is far from being linear. If a 
correlation exists, it is, at best, a very weak one that would require further testing. No 
noticeable effect on the kind of interaction can be observed. 
Generally, very little can be said about factors influencing the type of interaction, apart from 
the fact that relations on less concentrated markets tend to be more conflictual. This 
                                                 
19 With the possible exception of very small countries. One example of such a case would be the Australian-led 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 
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supports the argument that intervention forces establish themselves as market leaders 
mostly through their capacity to intimidate would-be spoilers. In cases when external forces 
have been withdrawn or are hampered by overly restrictive mandates or do not have 
sufficient strength, a conflictual mode of interaction is likely to continue into the post-
conflict phase. Afghanistan is certainly a case where an insufficient number of troops 
contributed to the lack of control of international forces over the security market. Even 
though the international forces number more than 40,000, there are only 1.4 troops per 
1,000 citizens. In comparison, most other missions had a higher per capita presence 
(Kosovo: 22.7, Bosnia-Herzegovina: 8.7, Sierra Leone: 3.2). Only two other missions had a 
similarly low presence on the ground, UNTAC (2.0) and ONUMOZ (Operations des 
Nations Unies au Mozambique) (0.4). While the first one failed, the second operated in a 
much more favorable environment in which both conflict parties showed an earnest 
commitment to peace. 
 
Table 10: Determinants of Market Structure in Type I Cases 
  Outcome Variables Independent Variables 
Case Year Structure Interaction  Differentiation DDR Peace Agreement 
# 
Parties 
Afghanistan 2005 Oligopoly Conflictual Homogenous No No High 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 1999 
Market 
Leader  
(SFOR) 
Neutral Homogenous Yes Yes Medium
Cambodia 1994 Oligopoly Conflictual Homogenous No Yes Medium
Kosovo 2002 
Market 
Leader 
(KFOR) 
Conflictual-
Neutral Homogenous Partial Yes Low 
Liberia 2006 
Market 
Leader 
(UNMIL) 
Cooperative-
Neutral Heterogeneous Partial Yes High 
Mozambique 1995 
Market 
Leader 
(Government) 
Cooperative-
Neutral Homogenous Yes Yes Low 
Sierra Leone 2006 
Market 
Leader 
(Government) 
Cooperative-
Neutral Heterogeneous Yes Yes Medium
 
Looking at the hypotheses together, it becomes clear that there is no monocausal 
explanation for market concentration. At first glance, even a partially successful DDR 
program appears to be sufficient. However, the success of such a program seems to be 
dependent on the deterrence effect of international forces acting in a peacekeeping 
function. Also, DDR programs are always part of broader peace arrangements, usually 
being only one part of a wide range of measures. Nevertheless, a DDR program seems to 
be a necessary condition for the sustainable improvement of public security: if such 
programs failed, the security market remained an oligopoly with a comparatively high level 
of violence. 
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guns, a large pool of demobilized veterans, legacies of drug addiction, the emergence of 
new criminal actors, an erosion of social and legal norms sanctioning violence, the 
emergence of a “culture of violence”, and population displacement (Mueller 2003, Human 
Security Centre 2005: 80, UNODC 2005: 29). 
Beyond direct violence, conflict also leads to psychological trauma. Epidemiological 
studies in post-conflict countries have shown that conflict leads to a higher prevalence of 
mental illness, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), mood disorders (such as 
depression), and other anxiety disorders. In most cases, the risks of suffering from one or 
more of these conditions was raised by a factor of three to ten compared with similar 
countries that had not experienced war (de Jong/Komproe/van Ommeren 2003: 2129). 
Unfortunately, these studies only cover a limited number of countries and do not 
disaggregate their findings by country. Due to this lack of comparable data, we have to rely 
on indirect indicators and anecdotal evidence. For the five markets dominated by a market 
leader, this results in an uneven picture. In the Liberian survey (see Table 2), about 70% of 
respondents said that they personally felt somewhat or very safe. More than 85% reported 
that their personal security had improved since the war (see Table 1). Lastly, 94.9% of 
respondents said that UNMIL, the market leader, was important for their personal security, 
with only 1.4% considering it as a threat to their well-being. The poll taken in Sierra Leone 
showed comparable results, although respondents were generally a bit more pessimistic, 
likely due to the uncertainty created by the prior withdrawal of UNAMSIL forces and the 
handing over of security provision to government actors. In spite of public skepticism, the 
police (87.8%) and the Armed Forces (81.4%) were rated as important for citizens’ 
personal security. These figures confirm the results of surveys conducted by the United 
Nations (Krasno 2005, 2006). 
Similar surveys in Kosovo showed a high degree of support for KFOR, particularly among 
minorities, as well as for para-state security organs like the Kosovo Police Service and the 
paramilitary Kosovo Protection Corps (ICG 2006: 3, Fn. 7). In general, interpersonal 
violence in Kosovo has been low in comparison with other post-conflict countries, despite 
well-publicized incidents suggesting the opposite. However, O’Neill rightly points out that 
this achievement of KFOR should be taken with a grain of salt: “It does no good to 
maintain, as did former U.S. secretary of state Albright, Lord Robertson of NATO, and 
others that the murder rate in Kosovo is lower than in Detroit, Berlin, Moscow, or wherever. 
This is irrelevant; ask a Serb or Roma if they feel safer today than they did in early 2000. 
Many incidents go unreported” (2002: 107). 
Just as in Kosovo, the international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to deter 
open violence relatively successfully. After a few years, homicide rates were at a level 
comparable to most Western European nations, although experts suspect that unreported 
household violence was high. At the same time, the mobility of the population continued to 
be restricted by lasting fears about personal safety, with many citizens preferring to stay 
within their ethnically bounded areas. 
Violent crime was the most salient security issue in Mozambique. After a very successful 
disarmament program, some demobilized veterans undoubtedly turned to banditry. 
According to human rights groups, certain criminals even enjoyed protection by high-
ranking state officials. Coupled with the police’s ineffectiveness as a crime-fighting force 
and the largely inoperable judicial system, public fear about crime was very high. Public 
dissatisfaction with the crime surge in the immediate post-conflict period led to the 
dismissal of the minister of the interior in 1996. 
Despite this inconsistent picture, violence levels seemed to be higher in the two “true” 
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oligopolies (markets without a market leader), thus supporting the general hypothesis. In 
Cambodia, open fighting between government forces and the Khmer Rouge, and also 
between different political factions, escalated after UNTAC’s withdrawal in late 1993 and 
continued until at least 1998, albeit with declining intensity. Similarly, violent crime in 
Phnom Penh increased substantially during the same time period. Verkoren also reports 
that the war has left behind a “culture of violence where the instant reaction to an apparent 
crime is to kill the perpetrator, rather than waiting for a case to work its way through the 
politicized, weak, and often corrupt court system” (2005: 294). Particularly in rural areas, 
citizens were wary of the police and other state institutions. Similar observations can be 
made in Afghanistan where the ongoing war between the Taliban and the alliance of state 
forces and international troops continues to exact a high toll on the civilian population. 
There, distrust of the state and the international troops is widespread, particularly in the 
Pashtun south of the country. Even among ethnic groups favorable to the intervention, 
there is uncertainty as to whether the fledgling state and the international troops of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
will be able to guarantee their security. As a result, alternative schemes of protection, of 
which the Taliban, the various warlords, and tribal militias are only three examples, 
continue to be in demand, further stabilizing the oligopoly of violence. 
Distrust of state institutions is not uncommon in the aftermath of civil war and was 
widespread in the other five cases as well. Nevertheless, the open fighting that 
characterized the post-conflict security markets in Afghanistan and Cambodia certainly 
represented a greater threat (in quantity as well as quality) to human security than revenge 
killings and violent crime in the other five markets. In this sense, the hypothesis that 
concentrated markets are safer for ordinary citizens is corroborated. 
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5.  Conclusion and Consequences for Political Practice 
 
Both case studies and the desk study have shown that the term and concept of “oligopolies 
of violence” is of high utility to describe constellations of actors in the “security market” 
distinct from a monopoly on the use of violence. The different sub-forms of oligopolies may 
lead to diverse outcomes. In this project, the sub-form of an oligopoly of violence with a 
dominant market leader received most attention. 
Concerning the policy-relevant questions posed at the outset, only some could be 
tentatively answered: 
• Can oligopolies of violence reduce the susceptibility of post-conflict societies to 
resort to violence in order to solve conflicts?  
Both the case studies on Liberia and Sierra Leone and the desk study 
confirm that at least those oligopolies of violence with a dominant market 
leader (usually the peacekeeping mission, later the state) have the potential 
to greatly reduce the level of insecurity, both in perceptions as well as in real 
terms. 
• Are these oligopolies of violence, consequently, considered legitimate by the 
central players and, more generally, by the population?  
This question could not be answered by the project, at least not directly. 
Instead of the legitimacy of the overall market structure, we could only gauge 
the legitimacy of individual violence actors. Apart from peacekeepers and 
state agencies, a predominant proportion of the population perceived private 
security companies and neighborhood watch teams as positive. This is an 
important finding that contradicts numerous normatively informed essays 
based on a blunt rejection of what is commonly described as privatization of 
security. The communalization of violence control in the absence of a strong 
state has to be observed more closely. It can be assumed that the resulting 
forms of security provision by neighborhood and village-based structures - 
not only in our case studies of Liberia and Sierra Leone – are frequently 
legitimate in the eyes of the majority of the population. 
• Can legitimate oligopolies of violence be transformed into legitimate monopolies of 
violence?  
Whether legitimate or not, in most post-conflict societies oligopolies of 
violence were – as a rule – not followed by monopolies of violence. However, 
in the “success cases”, they were succeeded by oligopolies of violence with a 
dominant market leader, either the state or an enduring peacekeeping 
mission. This finding can be considered as “better than nothing”. It should be 
remembered that, historically, the monopolization of violence was frequently 
associated with the widespread use of violence.  
• Should we cling to the ideal of the state’s monopoly of violence even when state 
actors lack legitimacy, and have proven inefficient in providing security?  
The answer to this question depends on the interpretation of our rather 
differentiated findings. On the one hand they urge us to reflect on “the factual 
force of norms”. Here, the respondents of the opinion polls in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone gave answers that must be interpreted as a clear preference for 
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“the” state. The ideal of the state (or of the ideal state) is still very much 
present in the mindset of people who have witnessed protracted phases of 
turmoil and war – an interesting finding in itself. However, the more 
qualitative research instruments revealed the distrust towards state agencies 
as they exist in reality. This mixed message is not easy to interpret: The 
research project as a whole invites policymakers to pay considerably more 
attention to alternative providers of security since they can be meaningful 
locally. This is also the thrust of the argument of Böge et al. (2009). 
Nevertheless, it would certainly go too far to portray oligopolies of violence as 
desirable outcomes of outside intervention. 
The project further sought to identify criteria for selecting non-state armed actors as 
cooperation partners. The need for such cooperation was corroborated by our findings: 
Whoever wishes to avoid costly, enduring protectorates as a by-product of ever more 
complex UN missions should not ignore non-state actors and has to consider cooperation. 
Two main criteria for such cooperation come into play: efficiency and local legitimacy. This 
legitimacy may again partly be the outcome of efficient security provision (output 
legitimacy), or it may be based on charisma, ideology, symbols and myths, or the 
congruence in important norms and convictions between the protectors and the protected. 
It is obvious that most western governments will find it impossible to cooperate with actors 
who openly violate human rights or make appeals for genocide. But even actors who do 
not qualify as partners should not be left out of any analysis about the security situation. As 
a minimum, a sober assessment of their local appreciation is needed. Potential strategies 
to integrate difficult non-state actors into a holistic security sector strategy may include 
inter alia a strategy of “certification” and an obligation to respect core human rights in 
exchange for recognition and recurrent, trustful cooperation. 
A separate finding concerns “post-conflict” situations in general: It is necessary to question 
the label “post-conflict” and avoid the mental dichotomies that lead to a handy identification 
of “post-conflict” with “peace”. We should strive to understand the particular logic of post-
conflict situations instead of dismissing them as brief, transitory stages. Such a perspective 
would also improve the research basis for policy advice. Usually, political strategies for 
post-conflict strategies employ timeframes that are far too short. These approaches also 
grossly overestimate the possibilities for social engineering, imagining post-conflict 
societies as “clean slates” upon which a bright new future can be written. As a result, 
reform agendas usually include a list of measures that even highly industrialized countries 
would find hard to implement (Ottaway 2002: 1007ff). “Good governance” is simply not 
feasible in countries shattered by internal war; “good enough governance” (DFID 2005: 20) 
would be a much more realistic goal. 
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6.  Directions for Further Research 
 
Post-conflict societies are too rarely evaluated in their own right. Instead, research and 
policy often approach these societies as passive victims of external forces beyond their 
control. By treating post-conflict countries as mere objects of Western policy and as 
staging grounds for international interventions, agency is being denied to local political 
actors and ordinary citizens alike. That local actors are only relevant to the degree in which 
they interact with external forces is evident in the discourse which casts these actors as 
either “spoilers” (Stedman 1997) or “change agents” (Mitchell 2006). This also entails that 
we broaden our focus beyond those post-conflict countries that the international 
community has intervened in and include other countries into the analysis. While there are 
often excellent single-case studies by political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, 
historians and area studies specialists about these other countries, they are usually not 
included in comparative research designs. Our project lays the groundwork for such a 
comparative endeavor in that it identifies three types of post-conflict societies. Further 
research would be necessary to see whether these three types also apply to other areas 
beyond security provision. 
The research instruments that could be used for this project were broad in scope, but 
clearly limited in time and space. The empirical basis in both Liberia and Sierra Leone was 
limited to the urban sphere. It is obvious that living in the rural areas – with less exposure 
to the international intervention force as well as (maybe) Western-inspired norms about the 
best way to provide security – could have an impact on responses. Furthermore, a one-off 
opinion poll and equally one-off focus group discussions could only provide a snapshot of 
the security situation at a given point in time. This kind of exercise should be conducted at 
regular intervals if we wish to gain a more accurate picture of the market dynamics. 
We also still know relatively little about how market dominance can be handed over from 
international forces to the new government of the country despite the fact that this phase is 
crucial for the overall success of any intervention. And even though the training of local 
security forces is a key component of all contemporary interventions in order to prepare 
them for the handover of security provision responsibilities, we do not know when and 
under what conditions such a withdrawal should take place. It might even be the case that 
the withdrawal puts the cart before the horse – it seems that international forces are not 
withdrawn if and when local conditions permit but rather when their domestic audiences 
demand it. As a result, local security forces are usually declared ready when international 
forces are leaving, not the other way around, turning the rationale of intervention on its 
head. What happens when international forces withdraw is relatively unknown, not least 
because the country suddenly becomes less relevant to Western interests. The theoretical 
framework based on Mehler’s “oligopoly” concept as well as this project’s empirical results 
suggest that with the exit of a major market actor, other actors will struggle to claim as 
much of the departing actor’s market share as possible. On the one hand, remaining major 
actors will try to improve their market position, sometimes through the use of violence. On 
the other hand, marginal actors will (re-)emerge to provide security for small sections of the 
population. This is a dynamic that is all too visible even outside post-conflict countries. For 
example, ethnic militias in Nigeria typically formed in those social or territorial spaces 
where the state had little to no presence (Agbu 2004: 15, Harnischfeger 2003). Similar 
processes could be observed in Karachi (Pakistan) and Sierra Leone after UNAMSIL’s 
withdrawal. Clearly, there is much that can still be learned about post-conflict societies. 
However, if these lacunae are addressed, there is reason to hope that the international 
treatment of these countries can be improved beyond their current state. 
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